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Carroll: Analysis of Mark v. Moser: Determining Duty of Care Between Sport

CASE NOTES AND COMMENTS
ANALYSIS OF MARK V. MOSER:
DETERMINING DUTY OF CARE
BETWEEN SPORTS CO-PARTICIPANTS IN
LIGHT OF THE INDIANA COMPARATIVE
FAULT STATUTE

I.

INTRODUCTION

Imagine, for a second, what it would be like to train for and
participate in a triathlon. Months of early morning swims are
followed immediately by rigorous training runs. Long bike rides
on the weekends replace trips to the mall and quality time with the
family. Finally, after all the hard work, comes race day. Still wet
from the strenuous mile swim, racers fly down the road on flashy
bikes. Then, it happens. One racer too self-involved and overly
concerned with winning the all important age group trophy
disregards ordinary and prudent care and cuts you off causing a
painful crash that results in serious injuries. Months of training
down the drain, expensive bike destroyed, hospital bills adding up,
this is the price paid for assuming that other weekend warriors
participating in "fun" triathlon events will exercise reasonable
care. And who pays for the bike and for the medical bills? If the
race was in Indiana and if the racer was only negligent, you pay.
This is Rebecca Mark's story. In Mark v. Moser,' plaintiff
Rebecca Mark suffered serious injuries that required
hospitalization as a result of Kyle Moser cutting in front of her
2
during the bike leg of a triathlon. The Indiana Court of Appeals
addressed whether Rebecca's negligence count against Kyle
should survive summary judgment and proceed to a jury.3 What
1Mark v. Moser, 746 N.E.2d 410 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).
2Id. at 413.
3 id.
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makes this case unique is that no Indiana case has specifically
addressed this duty issue since the state's adoption of the
Comparative Fault Act.4 In rejecting negligence, the court
concluded that the Act left sports participants especially vulnerable
to personal injury tort suits and, therefore, in order to afford them
extra protection the Act's principals do not apply to this class of
defendants. 5 Instead, the court applied an implied primary
assumption of risk doctrine and concluded that Rebecca was
barred from recovering on a negligence claim because she
assumed the inherent and foreseeable risks of the sport 6 and
because other jurisdictions have rejected the negligence standard.7
This casenote will argue that based on the state of the law in
Indiana with the adoption of the Comparative Fault Act, the court
should have permitted Rebecca's negligence count to proceed to a
jury. First, the doctrine of implied primary assumption of risk
should not have been applied as a complete defense because all
total bar defenses were eliminated through the Comparative Fault
Act.
Second, the court should not have disregarded the
Comparative Fault Act because courts cannot generally impose
common law exceptions on statutes. Finally, the court relied on
other jurisdictions that had rejected negligence as the proper
standard, however, it failed to recognize a distinction between
states with codified comparative fault schemes and those without.
In its analysis of Mark v. Moser, this casenote will first provide
background information, discussing defenses generally, standards
of care generally, and the current state of the law in Indiana. Part
Ill provides the facts, procedural history, and decision of Mark.
Part IV analyzes the Indiana Court of Appeals decision. Finally,
Part V discusses the potential impact the Mark decision may have.

4id.
5Mark, 746 N.E.2d 410 at 421.
6
7

Id. at419.
1[d. at 416-19.
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II. BACKGROUND

Unquestionably, participants in recreational sports are bound to
experience accidents and injuries in their quest for athletic glory.
However, a difficult question that has created a division among
varying jurisdictions is how and where to draw the line between
what is permissible competitive behavior, which results in simple
accidents and what is impermissible competitive behavior, which
results in lawsuit instigating injuries. 8 An important consideration
that has influenced what standard of care a court adopts is whether
the state in which the court resides permits implied assumption of
risk as a complete defense, 9 or whether the state has merged this
doctrine into a comparative negligence statute.' 0 Courts, which
8There has been disagreement among jurisdictions as to whether an athlete has
a legal obligation to avoid negligent conduct, or if the duty of care is lower, such
as recklessness or intentional misconduct. CompareBabych v. McRae, 567
A.2d 1269 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1989) (applying negligence standard to injury in
professional hockey game); Lavine v. Clear Creek Skiing Corp., 557 F.2d 730
(10tl Cir. 1977) (applying negligence standard to injury in collision between
snow skiers); Gray v. Houlton, 671 P.2d 443 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983) (applying
negligence standard to injury in collision between snow skiers); Duke's GMC,
Inc. v. Erskine 447 N.E.2d 1118 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983) (applying negligence
standard to golf injury); Lestina v. West Bend Mutual Insurance Co., 501
N.W.2d 28 (Wis. 1993) (applying negligence standard to injury in soccer game),
with Hoke v. Cullinan, 914 S.W.2d 335 (Ky. 1995) (applying recklessness
standard to injury incurred in tennis match); Connel v. Payne, 814 S.W.2d 486
(Tex. Ct. App. 1991) (applying recklessness standard to injury in a recreational
polo game); Turcotte v. Fell, 502 N.E.2d 964 (N.Y. 1986) (applying
recklessness to injuries in a professional horse race); Ross v. Clouser, 637
S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1982) (applying reckless standard to injuries in a recreational
softball game).
9 See Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696 (Cal. 1992) (applying primary assumption
of risk doctrine in barring negligence standard for injury sustained during touch
football game); Ford v. Gouin, 834 P.2d 724 (Cal. 1992) (negligence suit
involving injury sustained while waterskiing dismissed because it was barred by
assumption of risk doctrine); Estate of Foronda v. Hawaii Int'l. Boxing Club, 25
P.3d 826 (Haw.Ct.App. 2001) (negligence suit against boxing ring owner and
operator for death of fighter barred by primary assumption of risk doctrine).
'0See Auckenthaler v. White, 877 P.2d 1039 (Nev. 1994) (holding that in light
of state's elimination of assumption of risk through adoption of comparative
negligence statute, negligence applicable to injury sustained during recreational
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still permit the defense of implied assumption of risk, have
generally adopted a recklessness standard of care for actions
between sports participants. 1 On the other hand, courts, which
have completely subsumed the defense into a comparative
negligence scheme, have adopted negligence as the proper
standard of care.12 Finally, regardless of the assumption of risk
doctrine, courts seem to uniformly agree that when a sports
participant intentionally injures a co-participant he has breached a
13
legal duty.

horseback ride); Estes v. Tripson, 932 P.2d 1364 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997)
(applying negligence rather than recklessness to injury sustained in softball
game because application of a no duty assumption of risk doctrine would be
contrary to state comparative negligence statute); Lestina v. West Bend Mutual
Ins. Co., 176 Wis.2d 901 (Wis. 1993) (applying negligence standard to injury
sustained during soccer game, the court notes the state's elimination of
assumption of risk and adoption of comparative negligence).
1 See supranote 9 (string cite of cases applying recklessness on basis of
implied assumption of risk).
12 See supranote 10 (string cite of cases applying negligence in light of states'
adoption of comparative fault statutes and elimination of assumption of risk
doctrines).
13Most courts agree that an intentional act, which injures a co-participant
constitutes a clear cause of action in tort. Raymond L. Yasser, Liabilityfor
Sports Injuries, in LAW OF PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR SPORTS 14.01, 2
(Gary Uberstine, ed. 1992). Therefore, this note will not discuss intentional
misconduct, but rather will focus on the conflicting opinions regarding courts'
application of recklessness versus negligence.
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A. Defenses
14

1. The Doctrine ofAssumption ofRisk Generally

As a general definition, the doctrine of assumption of risk means
that "a plaintiff who voluntarily assumes the risk of harm arising
from the negligent or reckless conduct of the defendant cannot
recover for such harm."'15 This rule has been a source of great
confusion for courts because it has been interpreted and defined in
at least four different contexts. 16 In the context of implied
assumption of risk, the doctrine refers to a plaintiff who knows
that he risks being harmed by defendant's conduct, who does not
expressly consent to such risk, yet nevertheless manifests a
willingness to accept the risk by voluntarily proceeding in the face

defense of assumption of risk often overlaps that of contributory
negligence. In theory, the distinction between the two is that assumption of risk
rests upon voluntary consent of the plaintiff to encounter the risk, while
contributory negligence rests upon his failure to exercise the care of a
reasonable man for his own protection. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 496A
cmt. (d) (1965). The court in Mark v. Moser uses the terms assumption of risk
and contributory negligence relatively interchangeably and the distinction
between the two seems superfluous. Mark, 746 N.E.2d.410. The effect of the
common law contributory negligence defense was to completely bar a slightly
negligent plaintiff from recovery of any damages, even against a highly culpable
tortfeasor. Id. at 414. This appears more like assumption of risk because
generally, contributory negligence does not provide a defense against reckless
conduct, while assumption of risk does. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 496A
(d) (1965).
cmt.
15 Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 496A (1965).
16 Courts have used the doctrine in at least four different contexts: (1)plaintiff
14The

expressly assumes the risk; (2) plaintiff impliedly assumes the risk; (3) plaintiff
is aware of a risk already created by the defendants negligence and proceeds to
voluntarily encounter it; and, (4) plaintiff's conduct in voluntarily encountering
a known risk is in itself unreasonable, there is negligence by both parties.
Restatement Second of Torts § 496A. For purposes of this note, the focus will
be on whether a sports participant should be barred from recovering under a
negligence claim because of a state's imposition of the doctrine of implied
assumption of risk.
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of the danger. 17 Some courts divide implied assumption of risk into
two doctrines, "primary assumption of risk" and "secondary
assumption of risk."' 8
Primary assumption of risk generally requires the defendant to
show that (1) plaintiff had frll subjective understanding of the
nature and presence of a specific risk; and, (2) plaintiff voluntarily
chose to encounter the risk. 19 In its evaluation of these elements,
the court looks at the nature of the activity, the relationship of the
defendant to the activity, and the relationship of the defendant to
the plaintiff.20 If a court finds that the primary implied assumption
of risk doctrine is applicable, then the defendant owes no legal
duty to protect the plaintiff from the particular risk that caused the
injury.21 Therefore, because there can be no legal breach of duty,
there can be no claim of negligence hence, primary implied
a complete defense separate from
assumption of risk remains
22
negligence.
comparative
Secondary implied assumption of risk requires that (1) the
defendant owed a duty of care to plaintiff; and (2) that the plaintiff
proceeded to encounter a known risk imposed by the defendant's
breach. 3 Jurisdictions applying secondary assumption of risk
balance the party's respective faults, which is "quintessential to
comparative negligence; ' 24 hence, the doctrine of secondary
of risk is subsumed by comparative
implied assumption
25
negligence.
17

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 496A.
"'See Fowler V. Harper et al., The Law ofTorts § 21.0 (3d ed. 1996).
19
Fairchild v. Amundson, 104 Wash. App. 1027 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001).
20 Estate of Foronda v. Hawaii Intern. Boxing Club, 25 P.3d 826, 840

(Haw.Ct.App. 2001) (quoting Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696 (Cal. 1992).

21

Tincani v. Inland Empire Zoological Soc'y, 875 P.2d 621, 633 (Wash. 1994)

("implied primary assumption of risk is really a principle of no duty, or no

negligence, and so denies the existence of the underlying action").
22 Foronda,25 P.3d 826 at 836.
2 Id.
24

id.

25

A plaintiffs assumption of risk is unreasonable, and a form of contributory

negligence, where the known risk of harm is great relative to the utility of
plaintiffs conduct. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 496 comment c. See also
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2. The Doctrineof ComparativeFault Generally
Black's Law Dictionary defines comparative negligence as, "the
principle that reduces a plaintiffs recovery proportionally to the
plaintiffs degree of fault in2' 6 causing the damage, rather than
barring recovery completely.
A trend away from contributory negligence and total-bar
defenses emerged at the turn of the twentieth century with the
inception of comparative negligence schemes.2 7
Although
comparative negligence had a slow birth, by 1976 well over half
the states had adopted some form of comparative negligence,
either by statute or by "judicial fiat."28 Most jurisdictions which
have adopted comparative negligence have done so under statutory
provisions expressly imposing the doctrine. 29 As an outgrowth of
the wide spread codification of the doctrine, various forms of
comparative negligence have emerged.30
First, some jurisdictions have enacted statutory systems of
"pure" comparative negligence. 3 1 The "pure" form provides "for
the apportionment of damages between a negligent defendant and
a contributorily negligent plaintiff, regardless of the extent to
which either party's negligence contributed to the plaintiffs
harm. 32
Second, other jurisdictions have enacted statutory systems of
"modified" comparative negligence. 33 Under the "modified"
system, legislatures generally employ either a "less than" variation
Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions, Inc., 31 N.J. 44, 53 (N.J. 1959);
Foronda,25 P.3d 826 at 836.
26 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 276 (7hed. 1999).
27
Thomas R. Trenkner, Annotation, Modern Development of Comparative
Negligence DoctrineHaving Applicability To NegligenceActions Generally, 78
A.L.R.3d
339 (1977).
28
Id.

29 Id.
30
31

id.
Thomas R. Trenkner, Annotation, Modern Development ofComparative

Negligence DoctrineHaving Applicability To Negligence Actions Generally, 78
A.L.R. 339 (1977).
32

Td.

33 id.
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or a "less than or equal to" variation. 34 The "less than" variation
provides that "a plaintiffs contributory negligence is not a bar to
recovery if his negligence was less than that of the defendant,
though the damages which the plaintiff could recover would be
reduced by the degree of his negligence compared with that of the
defendant, or in proportion to the plaintiffs negligence." 35 The
"less than or equal to" variation is identical to the "less than"
variation except that the former provides that plaintiff is not barred
if his contributory negligence is equal to that of the
from recovery
36
defendant.
37
3. The Indiana ComparativeFault Statute

Prior to 1985, Indiana courts utilized a common law
contributory negligence rule.38 Contributory negligence was
defined as "the failure of a person to exercise for his own safety
that degree of care and caution which an ordinarily reasonable and
prudent person in a similar situation would exercise." 39 Under this
rule, a plaintiff who was just slightly negligent could be entirely
barred from recovering damages even though the defendant may
have been highly culpable. 40 This state of the law changed,
however, with the Indiana Legislator's adoption of the state's
Comparative Fault Act in 1985.41
The Indiana Comparative Fault Act states, "any contributory
fault chargeable to the claimant diminishes proportionately the
34

id.

35 Id.
36

id.
this point, I will be providing background information about the Indiana
Comparative Fault Act as the basis of my argument that the Indiana Court
Appeals incorrectly adopted recklessness as the standard of care between co37 At

in Mark v. Moser.
participants
38

See generally Kroger Co. v. Haun, 379 N.E.2d 1004 (Ind.Ct. App. 1978) (the

court
applies and discusses the common law contributory negligence rule).
39
Id.at 1007 (quoting Memorial Hospital of South Bend, Inc. v. Scott, 300
50, 57 (Ind. 1973).
N.E.2d
40
Haun,379 N.E.2d 1004.
41 See Indiana Comparative Fault Act, Ind.Code §34-51-2-5-6 (1998).
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amount awarded as compensatory damages.. .the claimant is
barred from recovery if the claimant's fault is greater than the fault
of all persons whose fault proximately contributed to the
claimant's damages. ' 42 The Indiana judiciary has recognized that
the legislative purpose for adopting the act was to "ameliorate the
harshness ' of3 the then prevailing doctrine of contributory
negligence. A
As applied to the Act, the term "fault" includes, "any act or
omission that is negligent, willful, wanton, reckless, or intentional,
toward the person or property of others." 44 The term also includes,
"unreasonable assumption of risk not constituting enforceable
express consent, incurred risk, and unreasonable failure to avoid an
injury or to mitigate damages. ' 45 Significantly, the Indiana
Supreme Court has stated that under the Act:
a plaintiffs incurred risk is considered 'fault' and is to be
compared to other fault contributing to the accident. Thus,
although at common law a plaintiff would have incurred the risk of
the entire accident, under the Comparative Fault Act, the plaintiff
has no longer incurred the entire risk but, theoretically, only a
portion of it. Accordingly, comparing incurred risk under the Act
with incurred 46risk at common law is a comparison of two distinct
legal theories.
Three years later in Heck v. Robey, the Indiana Supreme Court
specifically stated that incurred risk no longer survived as a
complete defense because it was contrary to the state's
Comparative Fault Act.47 The defense does, however, survive as
defense in that it may reduce or eliminate a plaintiffs recovery
depending on the apportionment of fault under the Act.48 Both the
Indiana Supreme Court and the Indiana Court of Appeals have
42

Indiana Comparative Fault Act, Ind. Code §34-51-2-5-6 (1998).
Baker v. Osco Drug, Inc., 632 N.E.2d 794, 797 (Ind.Ct. App.1994).
44 Ind. Code §34-6-2-45(b) (1998).
43

§34-6-3-45(b) (1998).
Baker v. Osco Drug, Inc., 632 N.E.2d 794, 797 (Ind.Ct. App.) (quoting State
Through Highway Dept. v. Snyder, 594 N.E.2d 783, 786 (Ind.1992).
(Ind. 1995).
47
4 Heck v. Robey, 659 N.E.2d 498, 504
1Id.at 505 n. 10.
45 Ind. Code
46
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held that the incurred risk defense is unavailable expect where a
plaintiff accepts a specific risk of which he had actual
knowledge. 49 Furthermore, the court has held that the incurred risk
defense, when available, is a subjective issue subject to a jury
determination.5 °
Finally, The Indiana Supreme Court has concluded that the Act
eliminated not just contributory negligence, but also all other
common 5 1law defenses, which entirely precludes a plaintiffs
recovery.

B. Standards of Care
53
2
1. Knight v. Jewett - Recklessness

In Knight v. Jewett, the defendant and plaintiff were opponents
in a game of touch football and, although the factual events
leading to the injury were disputed, it was undisputed that the
defendant stepped on and broke the plaintiffs finger.54 Plaintiff
filed a negligence suit against defendant. 55 The Supreme Court of
California had to decide how to apply the assumption of risk
doctrine in light of the court's adoption of comparative fault
49 See

Clark v. Wiegand, 617 N.E.2d 916, 918 (Ind. 1993) ("the doctrine of
incurred risk involves a subjective analysis focusing upon the plaintiff's actual
knowledge and appreciation of the specific risk and voluntary acceptance of the
risk"); Hopper v. Carey, 716 N.E.2d 566, 575 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that
the defense of incurred risk is only available if the plaintiff accepted a specific
risk and he had more than a general knowledge of the possibility of an accident).
so Clark,617 N.E.2d at 917 (the question of whether a student in a university
judo class incurred risk of injury from another student was a question for the
jury).
1Heck v. Robey, 659 N.E.2d 498, 504 (Ind. 1995).
5
2 Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 698 (Cal. 1992).
53 Recklessness is defined as, conduct whereby the actor does not desire the
consequences but nevertheless foresees the possibility and consciously takes the
risk; recklessness involves a greater degree of fault than negligence.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 500 (1965).
54 Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696 (Cal. 1992).
55

Id.

https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol11/iss2/5

10

Carroll: Analysis of Mark v. Moser: Determining Duty of Care Between Sport

DUTY OF CARE IN SPORTS

2001]

435

principles.56 The court held that the implied assumption of risk
doctrine had been only partially abrogated into the common law
comparative fault scheme.57 In its reasoning, the court stated that
California law recognized the division of assumption of risk into
the "primary" and "secondary" categories and that primary
assumption of risk continued to act as a total bar to recovery, while
secondary assumption of risk had been subsumed by the
comparative fault principles.5 8 In its application of the doctrine to
the instant case, the court held that assumption of risk had not been
completely abrogated and that it continued to act as a total bar on
the plaintiffs recovery.59 The court then concluded, through
reliance on policy rationales established in prior case law, that a
sports participant did not have a legal duty to avoid negligent
conduct, which injured a co-participant. 60 The court reasoned that
because the defendant did breach a legal duty, the doctrine of
primary assumption of risk was applicable and the plaintiff was
barred from recovery. 6 1 Hence, the common law comparative fault
principles were never applied.62
64
63
2. Auckenthaler v. White - Negligence

In Auckenthaler v. White, plaintiff, while participating in a
recreational horseback ride, was kicked and injured by another
rider's horse. 65 Plaintiff filed a negligence suit against both the
56 Notably, the

comparative fault principles have not been codified in California.

Id.
57 at 697.
Id. at 707-08.
58

1d.

59 Knight, 834
60 Id. at 708-12.P.2d
61 Id. at 712.

at 707-08.

621Id.
63 Auckenthaler v. White, 877
P.2d 1039 (Nev. 1994).
64 Black's Law Dictionary defines negligence as "the failure to exercise the
standard of care that a reasonably prudent person would have exercised in a
similar situation." A plaintiff ordinarily does not have a duTr to anticipate the
negligence
of another. BLACK'S LAW DICTiONARY 1056 (7 ed. 1999).
65
Auckenthaler, 877 P.2d 1039 at 1040.
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rider of the horse that struck her and the owner of the horse. 66 The
Nevada Supreme Court had to determine if adopting a recklessness
standard of care was appropriate in light of Nevada's abolition of
implied assumption of risk as a complete defense. 67 In holding that
negligence, and not recklessness, was the appropriate standard, the
court distinguished Nevada law from California. 68 The Nevada
Supreme Court explained that California's application of
recklessness was in effect a round-about way of determining that
the plaintiff assumed the risk of injury.69 The court reasoned that
this reduced standard of care would be contrary to the Nevada
negligence statute 7° because, unlike an implied assumption of risk
doctrine, comparative negligence focuses on the relative fault of
each party rather than on the lack of duty on the defendant's part.71
Therefore, the court concluded, "The district court erred by
adopting California's reckless or intentional standard of care. The
underlying facts of this case, and all forthcoming cases, are to be
examined by utilizing simple negligence rubric...we reverse the
district court's ruling and72 remand for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion."
C. Standardof Care in Indiana
In the past, the Indiana Court of Appeals has touched on the
73
issue of what standard of care is owed in sport's related injuries;
however, the state Supreme Court has never specifically addressed
66

Id.
67id.
68
Id.at 1041-42; see also supra text accompanying notes 58-62 discussing
reckless standard.
California's
69
Id. at 1042-43.
70
Notably, unlike California, Nevada has codified its comparative negligence
principles. Comparative Negligence, Nev. Rev. Stat. 41.141 (1996).
Auckenthaler, 877 P.2d 1039 at 1044 ("adopting a reduced standard of care is
merely another way of recognizing implied assumption of risk through the back
door or by way of duty/risk principles").
72
Id. at 1044.
73
See e.g. Duke's GMC, Inc. v. Erskine, 447 N.E.2d 1118 (ind. Ct. App. 1983)
(applying negligence standard in injured golfer's action against a corporation,
which paid the dues of the negligent golfer).
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the issue. 74 Furthermore, no Indiana state court has addressed the
75
issue since the adoption of the comparative fault act.
1. Webb v. Jarvis

76

--

DeterminingDuty as a Matter of Law

In Webb v. Jarvis, the Indiana Supreme Court had to determine
whether a physician could be held liable to a third party under a
negligence claim where an unknown third party was shot by a
patient whom the physician had prescribed anabolic steroids. 77 In
concluding that the defendant physician owed the unknown third
party plaintiff no duty, the court announced a three-part balancing
test for determining duty as a matter of law.78 According to the
Webb opinion, courts should balance the following three factors:
(1) the relationship between the parties, (2) the reasonable
foreseeability of harm to the person injured, and (3) public
policy.79 After applying the foregoing test to the circumstances of
this particular case, the Webb court stated that while in the instant
case the physician defendant owed no duty, in a changed factual
80
setting the duty analysis could have produced a different result.
Therefore, Indiana courts are required to engage in the foregoing
balancing test on an ad hoc basis for any case where the
defendant's duty of care is questionable.

74 The

Indiana Supreme Court has, however, addressed the issue of what the
applicable standard is when a sports participant sues a school or university for
an injury inflicted by a co-participant. It ruled that the applicable standard is
negligence. See Beckett v. Clinton Prairie Sch. Corp., 504 N.E.2d 552 (Ind.
1987) (applying negligence standard in student's action against school for injury
incurred from collision between two players during basketball game); see also
Clark v. Wiegand, 617 N.E.2d 916 (Ind. 1993) (applying negligence standard in
student's action against university for injury inflicted by fellow classmate
during judo class).
75
Mark, 746 N.E.2d 410 at 413.
76 Webb v. Jarvis, 575 N.E.2d 992 (Ind. 1991).
77 Id. at 993.
78
1Id. at 995.
79
1d.
'o Webb, 557 N.E.2d 992 at 998.
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2. Duke's GMC v. Erksine81 - Negligence
In Duke's GMC, the plaintiff was participating in a round of golf
when he was struck in the eye by a fellow golfer's stray ball. 2 As
a result of this incident, plaintiff lost sight in one eye and
subsequently filed suit.8 3 Rather than sue the golfer responsible
for his injuries, plaintiff sued the corporation that the injury84
inflicting golfer was president of and, which paid his club dues.
The Indiana Court of Appeals had to address issues concerning
admission of certain evidence and disputed jury instructions.8 5 In
delivering its opinion on plaintiffs disagreement with the trial
court's incurred risk instruction, the court of appeals stated that a
golfer could not incur the risk of another golfer's negligence as a
matter of law.8 6 In response to an argument that the trial court
erred in instructing the jury to assume that all participants would
observe the rules of the game, the court of appeals stated, "the
recognized rules of a sport are indicia of the standard of care
which the players owe each other. While a violation of these rules
may not be negligence per se, it may well be evidence of
negligence. ' 87 Although not specifically stated in the opinion,
it
88
standard.
negligence
a
applied
court
the
though
as
appears

81

Duke's GMC v. Erksine, 447 N.E.2d 1118 (Ind.Ct. App. 1983).

12 Id.at
83 id.

1120

84 id.
85

Id.at 1123.
Erksine,447 N.E.2d at 1123.
87
Id. at 1124.
88
Infact, the court in Mark stated that it assumes negligence was applied in this
86

case. Mark, 746 N.E.2d 410 at 416 n. 2 ("While the standard is unclear, it
appears from the court's holding and analysis of how violations of the rules of
sport affect the negligence analysis, that it permitted the case to proceed under a
negligence standard").
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Ill. MARK V. MOSER

A. Facts
On September 7, 1997, Rebecca Mark (plaintiff) and Kyle
Moser (defendant) each competed in a triathlon race in Marion
County, Indiana.8 9 The race consisted of three consecutive events,
swimming, bicycling, and running. 90 During the bicycle leg of the
race, defendant was riding on the left side of plaintiff and cut in
front of her.91 Consequently, the two athletes collided and plaintiff
was hospitalized for serious injuries. 92 Prior to the event, all racers
were required to sign an entry form, which included an agreement
to abide by the rules of the USA Triathlon organization and a
release of liability waiver.93 Defendant was disqualified from the
race for violating a USA Triathlon rule that stated: "No cyclist
shall endanger himself or another participant. Any cyclist, who
intentionally presents a danger to any participant or who, in the
judgment of the Head referee, appears to present a danger to any
participant shall be disqualified., 94 The referee stated that he
disqualified the defendant, not because he acted intentionally,
rather he was disqualified for violating the rule "because by
moving over, an accident occurred." 95
B. ProceduralHistory
Plaintiff subsequently filed a two count complaint asserting first,
that the collision was a result of defendant's negligence and
second, that in the alternative, defendant had acted recklessly and
89 Mark

90 Id.
91

v. Moser, 746 N.E.2d 410 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).

-d.

92

id.
93 Id. The release waiver signed by the participants did not relieve the individual
from liability. It only acted to relieve the sponsor from liability.
athletes
94
Mark, 746 N.E.2d at 410.
95 Id.
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willfully in causing her injuries. 96 The trial court granted summary
judgment for the defendant as to Count I of plaintiffs complaint
and she appealed.97 On appeal, the Indiana Court of Appeals had to
define what standard of care one competitor owed another in a
sporting event in light98 of Indiana's codification of the Indiana
Comparative Fault Act.
C. The Court's Opinion
The Indiana Court of Appeals upheld the trial courts grant of
summary judgment and stated that (1) the Comparative Fault Act
was inapplicable to cases involving co-participants in a sporting
event; 99 and (2) an objective primary assumption of risk doctrine is
applicable. 00 The court held that "voluntary co-participants in
sports activities assume the inherent and foreseeable dangers of the
activity and cannot recover for injury unless it can be established
that the other participant either intentionally caused injury or
engaged in conduct so reckless as to be totally outside the range of
ordinary activity involved in the sport."' 01
1. Indiana ComparativeFaultAct
The court held that the Indiana Comparative Fault Act did not
apply to the instant case. 102 Under comparative fault principles, a
plaintiff, whose "fault" meets the statutory definition, 10 3 is allowed
recovery on a basis of apportionment of fault. 10 4 The court
specifically acknowledged this statutory construction in its
9

' Mark, 746 N.E.2d at 413.

97

1-d.
9s Id.; see Ind. Code §34-51-2-5
99Id. at

421.
"' Id. at 419.
1 Mark, 746 N.E.2d at 420.
102
/d at 421.
103 The term fault includes, "unreasonable assumption of risk not constituting
enforceable express consent, incurred risk, and unreasonable failure to avoid an
injury or to mitigate damages" Ind. Code §34-6-3-45(b).
I Baker, 632 N.E.2d. at 797.
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Yet, despite this acknowledgement, the court
opinion.10 5
nevertheless reasoned that when the Indiana legislator eliminated
its common law contributory negligence principles10 6 in favor of
the comparative fault act it failed to account for situations where
parties are unable to protect themselves.10 7 The court reasoned that
this legislative oversight left a "void in the law." 108 According to
the court, sports participants are unable to adequately protect
themselves from liability, while event organizers and sponsors are
afforded protection by securing waivers. 0 9 Therefore, the court
held that, because it is the job of the judiciary to fill voids in the
law, participants in sporting events are barred as a matter of law
from recovering against co-participants for injuries sustained as
the result of inherent or foreseeable dangers of the sport.110
2. PrimaryAssumption ofRisk
In its analysis, the court concluded that it was necessary, as a
matter of policy, for it to adopt an objective primary assumption of
risk doctrine, which acts as a total bar defense."' By adopting this
doctrine, the court held that a jury trial should not be used to
determine whether a plaintiff incurred the risk of injury inflicted
by co-sports participants, rather, this determination should be
made by the court as a question of law. 112 In its determination of
this question, the court stated that it looks at whether the injurycausing event was an inherent or reasonably foreseeable part of the
113
game, such that the plaintiff manifested an assumption of risk.
N.E.2d at 414.
("Under the common law system of contributory fault, application
of the doctrine of incurred risk would have allowed the judiciary to protect
parties who, as here, cannot take steps to legally protect themselves for
105 Mark, 746

106 Id.at 421.

liability").
107
id.

108 id.
1091d.

"0Mark, 746 N.E.2d at 421.

111 Id. at 419.
112 id.
113

id.
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Finally, the court instructed that if a plaintiff did not assume the
risk, then the case should proceed to a jury on the question of
whether the defendant intentionally or recklessly 14 caused the
injury. 1 5 The court concluded that the district court was correct in
granting the defendant summary judgment as to Count I and it
remanded the case back to the trial court for Count II to determine
116
whether the plaintiff assumed an inherent and foreseeable risk.
IV. ANALYSIS OF MARK v. MOSER
The state of Indiana has taken definitive steps to eliminate
unnecessarily harsh statutory and common-law defenses that
impose a complete bar on a plaintiffs recovery in personal injury
tort suits. The elimination of these defenses is apparent in light of
17
the state's codification of the Indiana Comparative Fault Act"
and the state Supreme Court's interpretation and usage of the
Act."18 Furthermore, other jurisdictions, which have subsumed
assumption of risk into comparative fault statutes, have ruled that
negligence is the proper standard of care to be applied in cases
involving injuries inflicted by one sports participant on another' 1 9
Notably, in its analysis of what standard of care to apply the court stated,
"apart from policy rationales, some courts have justified adoption of a
recklessness or intentional standard of care on the grounds that a participant in a
sports activity assumes the risks inherent in that activity." Along with this
reasoning, the court stated it chose to apply a recklessness standard instead of
negligence for various policy reasons, which included concerns about possible
mass tort litigation, a chilling effect on sports, and a decrease in the intensity
with which athletes would participate. Id. at 418-21. Although each of these
policy rationales can be disputed, they are not the focus of this Note. For a
recent Case Note that argues against these policy rationales see Mark M.
Rembish, Liabilityfor PersonalInjuries Sustainedin SportingEvents After
Jaworski v. Kiernan, 18 QuINNi'Ac L. REV. 307 (Summer 1998).
"' Mark, 746 N.E.2d at 419.
6Id. at 414.
1
7 Indiana Comparative Fault Act, Ind. Code §34-51-2-5 through -6.
"' Heck, 659 N.E.2d at 505 (Ind. 1995) (holding that the Comparative Fault Act
114

eliminated all complete defenses to a plaintiffs recovery).
19 See supra note 10 for a string cite of cases applying negligence standard in
light of states' adoption of comparative fault statutes.
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It appears, therefore, that the Indiana Court of Appeals incorrectly
decided Mark v. Moser by applying primary implied assumption of
risk 120 in a blatant disregard of the Indiana Comparative Fault
Act 12 1 2 and by rejecting negligence as the proper standard of
care.

12

A. The Indiana Court of-Appeals Was Incorrectin Applying
PrimaryAssumption ofRisk as a Complete Defense
The Indiana Court of Appeals incorrectly applied the doctrine of
implied primary assumption of risk. 123 The court was wrong in its
holding because the Indiana Supreme Court has ruled that the
Act's definition of "fault" eliminated all defenses, which impose a
total ban on a plaintiffs recovery. 124 The Indiana Supreme Court
has stated that, "any rule that purports to effect an absolute defense
based upon incurred risk is contrary to our comparative fault
scheme.' ' 125 Furthermore, the state's high court has concluded that
the incurred risk defense exists as a partial defense and that it
the issue by balancing the
requires a jury to subjectively address
126
fault.
of
degrees
party's respective
The court of appeals' holding in Mark fails to give any credence
to the clear language of the Act or to the state's high court's
interpretation of it. Rather, the court of appeals reaches a
conclusion, which is directly contrary to the Act. The court's
holding in Mark stated that in suits between co-participants,
whether the injury causing event was reasonably foreseeable, and
thus an incurred risk, is a question of law for the courts to

120 Mark, 746

12 1 Id. at

'2id.

N.E.2d at 419.

421.

1'3Id. at 419.

N.E.2d at 505; see also supra text accompanying notes 42-51
discussing the Indiana Legislator's definition of the term "fault" in the
Comparative Fault Act and Indiana Supreme Court decisions interpreting the
term.
124 Heck 659

125
126

d.

id.
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determine. 127 If the court answers this inquiry in the affirmative,
then plaintiffs are barred from recovery. 128 This holding clearly
constitutes a rule that "purports to affect an absolute defense based
upon incurred risk.', 12 9 Despite the obvious inconsistency in the
adoption of this rule and the state Supreme Court's admonition of
it, the court of appeals nevertheless decided that plaintiffs injured
during recreational sports activities are excluded from enjoying
rights granted by the Indiana Supreme Court under the Act. 130 The
court of appeals weakly stated that, "as a matter of policy, we
prefer to avoid the need to hold a jury trial to determine whether
the plaintiff incurred the risk of injury in every case involving a
sports injury caused by a co-participant. We can prevent this
necessity by adopting an objective primary assumption of risk
131
doctrine and a standard of care greater than negligence."'
However, the court of appeals failed to state clearly and directly
what its "policy" reasons were for why
it would "prefer" to
132
law.
well-established
disregard
effectively
Amazingly, the court of appeals comes to this conclusion despite
the fact that the Indiana Supreme Court has reversed the appellate
court's use of implied primary assumption of risk in the past. 133 In
127 Mark, 746

N.E.2d at 419; see also supra text accompanying notes 111-116

discussing court's conclusion that an objective primary implied assumption of
risk
128 id.doctrine should be used.
129 The rule announced
in Mark that a plaintiff suing a co-participant can be
completely barred from recovery on the basis of incurred risk is precisely the
rule that the state Supreme Court found repugnant to the Comparative Fault Act.

Heck, 659 N.E.2d at 505.
130 Id. at 505; See also supra note. 118 (discussing elimination of total bar
defenses).
131
Mark, 746 N.E.2d at 420 (emphasis added).
132 The court discusses various policy reasons throughout its opinion for why
negligence should not be adopted as the proper standard of care between sports
participants. see supranote 114. However, these policy reasons in no way
advance, or purport to advance, an argument that a jury trial should not be used.
Rather, these policy arguments assert that negligence would have an adverse
affect on sports and would fail to adequately protect defendants. The court
therefore, fails to advance any policy rationales asserting legitimate reasons for

denying plaintiffs in sports injury suits a jury trial.
133 Heck, 659 N.E.2d at 505.
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Heck v. Robey, Justice Shelby of the Indiana Supreme Court
stated, "In other jurisdictions primary assumption of risk may be
either express or implied. We reject this primary-assumption-of
risk terminology to the extent that it suggests that a lack of duty
may stem from a plaintiffs incurred risk. Under the Act, a
plaintiff may relieve a defendant of what would otherwise be his or
her duty to the plaintiff only by express consent." 13 4 A rule,
therefore, purporting to impose an absolute bar on a negligently
injured sports participant's right to recover on the suggested basis
that the participant impliedly assumed the risk through voluntary
participation is inconsistent with Indiana law as interpreted by the
is exactly the rule announced by
state Supreme Court. Yet, this
135
the court of appeals in Mark.
In a footnote in his Heck opinion, Justice Shelby backpedaled
slightly and stated "the court may determine on other grounds that
no duty exists based upon '(1) the relationship between the parties,
(2) the reasonable foreseeability of harm to the person injured, and
(3) public policy.""' 136 Therefore, it is plausible that the court of
appeals could have engaged in an analysis in which it applied this
three part test and concluded that for reasons comporting with
precedent the defendant in Mark did not owe a duty to the plaintiff.
However, it did not engage in such an analysis. 13 7 In fact, the
court never even cited the foregoing test or the case in which it
originated.1 38 Furthermore, even if the court had engaged in such
an analysis, it would nevertheless be incorrect in announcing a
bright line rule that in all recreational activities a sports participant
never has a duty to refrain from acting negligently with regard to a
fellow participant.1 39 Such a rule is contrary to the balancing test
134 m.
135

Mark, 746 N.E.2d at 421; See also supra text accompanying notes 111-116.

136 Heck, 659 N.E.2d at 505, n.11.
137
See generally Mark.
138 See

generally Mark; see also Webb v. Jarvis, 575 N.E.2d 992, 995 (Ind.
1991) (holding that a court should balance the following three factors in
determining if a duty is owed: (1) relationship between the parties, (2)
reasonable foreseeability of harm to the person injured, and (3) public policy
concerns).
139 Mark, 746 N.E.2d 410 at 420; see also supra text accompanying note 101.
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140

announced inWebb.
Just prior to announcing the three part balancing test, the Webb
court stated, "whether, the law recognizes any obligation on the
part of a particulardefendant to conform his conduct to a certain
141
standard for the benefit of a plaintiff is a question of law."
Apparently, the Webb court intended courts to balance these
factors for the particular parties in each case where the question of
what, if any, legal duty is owed. Nowhere in its opinion in Mark
did the court of appeals engage in this balancing test. Rather, when
it announced that negligence should not be applied to this class of
cases it relied on rebuttable policy arguments advanced by other
jurisdictions and on its own preference for having courts rather
than juries decide the issue of incurred risk. 142 In reaching this
conclusion, the court not only acted in a blatant disregard for the
Indiana Supreme Court's ruling in Webb, 143 but it also disregarded
the state Supreme Court's decision in Clark.144
Thus, the only legitimate means by which the court of appeals
could have concluded that the plaintiff was barred as a matter of
law from recovering damages on a negligence basis would have
been to apply the specific facts and circumstances of the case to
the three part Webb balancing test and conclude that this particular
defendant's duty did not rise to the level of negligence. The
court's application of the implied primary assumption of risk
doctrine was, therefore, an illegitimate means for concluding that
the plaintiff was barred as a matter of law from recovering under
her negligence count.

140 See Webb, 575 N.E.2d at 995 (in announcing three part test, court seems to

suggest that courts should balances factors on an ad hoc basis, rather than
pronouncing generally that an entire class of defendants is free from owing an

entire class of plaintiffs a certain duty of care); See also supratext
accompanying note 80.
141
Id. (emphasis added).
142 Mark, 746 N.E.2d at 419; see also supra text accompanying notes 111-114.
143 See generally Webb, 575 N.E.2d at 992; see also supratext accompanying

notes 79-81.
'44 Clark, 617 N.E.2d at 917(stating the issue of incurred risk is a subjective

inquiry for the jury).
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B. The Indiana ComparativeNegligence Act
The court was incorrect in upholding summary judgment for
Count I of plaintiffs complaint because it ignored the legislative
purpose and language of the Comparative Fault Act and because it
ignored the judicial interpretation of the Act. The clear legislative
purpose of the Indiana Comparative Fault Act was to obviate the
severity of the effects of the common-law contributory negligence
scheme. 145 Under the old contributory negligence principles a
plaintiff who was negligent, even just slightly negligent, could not
146
recover anything in an action against the tortuous defendant.
Recognizing the harshness of this rule, the state legislator followed
the path of over half the states 147 and enacted a comparative fault
149
scheme. 148 This modified "less than or equal to" scheme
instructs courts to apportion the respective "faults" of the
parties. 150 The Act expressly defines "fault" as, "any act or
omission that is negligent, willful, wanton, reckless, or intentional
toward the person or property of others."'151 Thus, through the
codification of the Act, the legislator has expressly and
unmistakably enacted a change in the common law whereby the
focus is on the relative fault of the parties and any rule completely
eliminating a plaintiff s ability to recover damages is disfavored.
In its opinion in Mark, the court of appeals acknowledges the
legislative purpose, it acknowledges the wording and effect of the
Act, 152 and then it turns its back to the legislature and to the
common law and declares that liability is not triggered by
negligent acts and that the implied primary assumption of risk

141 Baker, 632
146

N.E.2d at 797.
See supratext accompanying notes 38-40.

147 See
148
149

supra text accompanying note 28.

See supra note 41.

See supra text accompanying note 36 defining "less than or equal to" form of

comparative
negligence
150

See supratext accompanying note 42 reciting the Indiana Comparative Fault

Act.
151Ind. Code §34-6-2-45(b) (1998).
152 Mark, 746 N.E.2d at 414.
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doctrine acts as a complete bar to plaintiffs recovery. 153 What
happened to "ameliorating the harshness of contributory
negligence?"' 4 What happened to apportioning fault? Apparently,
sports participants are a special kind of plaintiff not worthy of the
same statutory protections as other plaintiffs. The court declares
that because sport's participants are unable to adequately protect
themselves by securing waivers or release of liability forms prior
to competition it is the job of the judiciary to provide these
potential defendants with greater protection than the Comparative
Fault Act provides. 15 5 This declaration is at direct odds with the
language and purpose of the Indiana Comparative Fault Act.
In cases where the Comparative Fault Act is applicable, the
courts are required to allow a jury to award a plaintiff damages
based on an apportionment of the parties respective faults. 156 The
legislative definition of fault for purposes of the Act expressly
includes negligence. 157 The Indiana legislator clearly intended to
eliminate situations in which a plaintiff is barred from any
recovery and this intent has been expressly recognized by the state
Supreme Court. 58 A claim that the plaintiff in Mark bears some
amount of responsibility or fault through her voluntary
participation invokes the Act and necessitates a jury determination
of damages based on each parties fault. Therefore, any court
correctly applying the Comparative Fault Act to the Mark case
would submit the plaintiffs negligence count to a jury for a
determination of damages based on allocation of fault. The
Indiana Court of Appeals, however, decided summary judgment
was appropriate.
Apparently, the court of appeals does not dispute that, if
correctly applied, the comparative fault act would have required
denying defendant's motion for summary judgment. Rather than
dispute this point, the court of appeals stated that:
15 3 Id. at 420; see also supra text accompanying note 111.

N.E.2d at 797.
Mark, 746 N.E.2d at 421; see also supra text accompanying notes 108-110.
See supratext accompanying notes 42-50.
7 Ind. Code §34-6-2-45(b) (1998); See also supra text accompanying note 44.
158
See supra text accompanying notes 42-50.
'54 Baker, 632
'51
56
'
15
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When our legislator abandoned contributory
negligence as a total bar to recovery and established
a comparative fault regime, it did not account for
situations where parties are unable to protect
themselves from liability. Thus there is a void in
the law.
We recognize that one of the
responsibilities of the judiciary is to fill such voids.
Accordingly, we determine that, as a matter of law,
participants in sporting events will not be permitted
to recover against their co-participants for injuries
sustained as the result
of the inherent or foreseeable
159
dangers of the sport.
In its announcement of this "void filling" function, 60 the court
of appeals does not cite any authority granting it the power to
create common law exceptions to clearly drafted statutes. Perhaps
the court failed to provide such authority because it has been an
established rule in Indiana since 1887 that when the words of a
statute are unambiguous and its purpose is clear, courts do not
have the power to create exceptions to statutes.1 61 Furthermore,
the Indiana Supreme Court has stated that because the Act is in
"derogation of the exiting common law" it must be construed
strictly. 162 Therefore, the court of appeals had an obligation to
strictly construe and follow the Comparative Fault Act, which
would require the court to allow plaintiffs negligence count to go
to ajury.

159 Mark, 746 N.E.2d at 421.
160 In engaging in this "void filling" the court of appeals is essentially applying
incurred risk as a total bar on plaintiff's ability to recover as a matter of law.
Such a rule is directly contrary to the Act and the common law
interpretation/application of the Act. See supratext accompanying notes 42-50.
161 Eastman v. State, 10 N.E. 97, 99 (Ind. 1887) (stating, "...the [judiciary's]

authority to create exceptions is one to be exercise with great delicacy. It can
never be exercised where the words of the statute are free from ambiguity, and
its purpose plain").
162 Indianapolis Power & Light Co. v. Snodgrass, Inc., 578 N.E.2d 669, 673
(Ind. 1991).
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C. PrecedentSupports Negligence Standard
In reaching its conclusion that negligence is not the proper
standard of care, the Mark court stated that the question of what
obligation a sports participant owes a co-participant had not been
directly addressed in Indiana and, therefore, it relied on policy
arguments advanced by other jurisdictions.163 Apparently, the
appropriate method for determining what duty of care a defendant
164
owes a plaintiff is the application of the Webb balancing test.
However, even assuming that the court of appeals could have
decided what standard of care was applicable without applying the
Webb test, precedent supports adoption of negligence, not
recklessness. While it is true that the duty of care question with
regard to sports co-participants has not been directly and
decisively ruled on in Indiana, the state's case law on similar
165
issues suggests that negligence is the proper standard of care.
Furthermore, the law in other jurisdictions clearly supports an
fault
argument that in states that have codified a comparative
1 66
scheme, negligence is the proper standard of care.
1. Indiana Case Law
The Indiana Supreme Court has applied a negligence standard in
civil suits involving injuries inflicted on a sports participant by a
co-participant. 167 The court of appeals distinguished its decision in
Mark on the basis that the plaintiffs in the foregoing cases were
suing a school or university and not the injury-inflicting coparticipant. 168 According to the court of appeals reasoning, a
negligence standard is applicable in suits against a school and not a
co-participant because, "there is a well established duty on the part
of such institutions and their personnel to exercise ordinary and
163

Mark, 746 N.E.2d at 416-19.

Webb, 575 N.E.2d at 992; see also supra text accompanying notes 77-80.
supra notes 73-74.
See generallyAuckenthaler,; see also supratext accompanying notes 65-72.
166
167
See supra note 74.
161
Mark, 746 N.E.2d at 419.
164

165 See
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reasonable care for the safety of those under their authority,
however, no such analogous authority or responsibility exists
between co-participants.' 69 Concededly the duty question is
significantly different when the defendant is a school; however,
the court appears to be incorrect in its pronouncement that "no
such analogous authority or responsibility exists between co170
participants.',
In Duke's GMC, it appears that the Indiana Court of Appeals
allowed a negligence claim to be brought by an injured golfer
against the injury-inflicting golfer's corporation. 171 The Mark
court acknowledged the apparent use of negligence when it stated,
"while the standard is unclear, it appears from the court's holding
and analysis of how violations of the rules of sport affect the
negligence analysis, that it permitted the case to proceed under a
negligence standard.' ' 172 Therefore, while the case law on the
question of duty between co-participants may not be as wellestablished as the duty imposed on schools, it does suggest that the
court be receptive to negligence claims. The Mark court handled
this discrepancy with a one line statement in a footnote that, "to
the extent Duke's GMC is inconsistent with this opinion it is
disapproved.' 73 The court ignored and disapproved the state of
the law in Indiana on the basis of arguments advanced by courts in
other jurisdictions. 174 What the court either fails to recognize or
acknowledge is that many jurisdictions which have adopted a
comparative fault scheme permit negligence claims between co175
participants.
2. The Law in OtherJurisdictions
The court in Mark cites numerous cases from a variety of
169 id.
170 id.

17 1 See generallyDuke's GMC; see also supra note 88.
172 Mark, 746 N.E.2d at 416 n. 2; see also supra note 88.
'73 Mark, 746 N.E.2d at 420 n. 5.
' 74 Id. at 416-19.
17SSee generallyAuckenthaler; see also supratext
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jurisdictions in reaching its conclusion that negligence should not
be the applicable standard in personal injury suits between sports
participants.176 In relying on these foreign cases, the court focuses
on not just policy rationales, but also on the rationale that some of
these courts have justified rejecting negligence on the basis of
assumed risk.1 7 7 To the extent the court relies on these foreign
jurisdictions, it is wrong.
Specifically, the court cites a California case, Knight v. Jewett,
in support of the argument that negligence was inappropriate
because "risk of injury is a common and inherent aspect of sports
and recreational activity."'178 In Knight, the court engaged in a
lengthy analysis of the state of the law in California and concluded
that because implied primary assumption of risk survived as a total
defense in that state, the plaintiff was barred from recovery.' 79 In
Auckenthaler v. White, a Nevada case, the Nevada Supreme Court
adopted negligence as the proper standard of care in personal
injury sports suits and explicitly distinguished California law from
Nevada law on the basis of comparative negligence. 180 In
reference to California's adoption of a standard of care lower than
negligence, the Nevada court stated that, "adopting a reduced
standard of care is merely another way of recognizing implied
assumption of risk through the back door or by way of duty/risk
principles."'181 The court further explained its adoption of
negligence by stating that under the Nevada comparative fault law,
the focus should be on the relative fault of each party and not on
the lack of duty on the defendant's part. 82 Because the state of the
law in Indiana regarding assumption of risk and comparative fault
is more comparable to Nevada than California, 183 the court should
have applied the reasoning of Auckenthaler rather than Knight. In
176 Mark, 746

N.E.2d at 416-19.

177 Id. at 418; see also supranote 114.
178

Mark, 746 N.E.2d at 418-19.

179 See generally Knight; see also supra text accompanying notes 57-62.
180 See generally Auckenthaler; see also supra text accompanying notes 65-72.

' Auckenthaler, 877 P.2d at 1044; see also supranote 71.
1 See generally Auckenthaler; see also supratext accompanying notes 65-72.
183 In both Indiana and Nevada comparative fault principles have been codified,
whereas, in California they have not; see supranote 70.
82
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so doing, the court should have concluded that on the basis of the
Comparative Fault Act it would be proper to apply a negligence
standard to an analysis of each of the party's relative fault.
V. IMPACT

The court's decision in Mark v. Moser looks very much like
a usurpation of power and the court seems to be acting more like a
super legislator than a court of appeals. The danger in this result is
that it essentially tells courts in Indiana that they are free to
disregard unambiguous statutes with clear legislative purposes.
Now, any time justices of a court have "preferences" that may be
contrary to a statutory scheme they can rely on Mark and simply
state that the legislator left a "void in the law" and create
exceptions in accord with their preferences.
The legislator is supposed to be the voice of the people.
Citizens engage in the political processes of lobbying and voting to
ensure that legislation reflects the preferred policy of the majority
of people of the state. By creating a common law exception to a
clearly written and interpreted statute, the court of appeals
overstepped its judicial boundaries at the expense of any person
choosing to participate in recreational athletic events in Indiana. If
these athletes believe that the Comparative Fault Act has rendered
them exceptionally vulnerable to personal injury suits, then they
have political means whereby they can encourage the legislator to
amend the law. Allowing a panel of justices to amend the law,
however, replaces the voice of the majority with the voice of a few
judges. Such a result flies in the face of our nation's democratic
process.
Another potential impact of the Mark decision is that it seems to
suggest courts may ignore well-established law. The main focus
of the Mark decision was on whether or not the defendant's legal
duty could be judged according to negligence principles. 184 The
Indiana Supreme Court has announced a clear three-part balancing

184See generallyMark.
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185
test for courts to use when a question of legal duty arises.
Rather than use this three-part test, the court of appeals relied
solely on policy arguments and on an improper use of the implied
The decision could,
primary assumption of risk doctrine.
therefore, cause confusion as to what the proper means for
determining legal duty of care is and it could also encourage future
courts to depart from established law with no explanation.

VI. CONCLUSION

The Indiana Court of Appeals incorrectly decided Mark v.
Moser. First, the court's decision wrongfully applied an implied
primary assumption of risk doctrine as a complete defense. By
announcing that sports participants are barred from recovering any
damages for negligence claims on the basis that they assume the
inherent and foreseeable dangers of the sport, the court ignored the
clear wording of the Comparative Fault Act as well as the state
Supreme Court's interpretation of it. In declaring the defendant in
Mark did not have an obligation to refrain from negligent conduct,
it should have employed the Webb balancing test and kept its
decision refined to the factual circumstances of the case.
Second, the court's decision wrongfully created a common law
exception to the Indiana Comparative Fault Act. In announcing
that because the Act left a "void" in the law any defendants sued
for inflicting injuries on co-participants are exempted from the
Act's elimination of total bar defenses, the court of appeals
overstepped its judicial power. The Act has clear wording and a
clear purpose. The court of appeals acknowledges this in its Mark
decision. Therefore, in accordance with the law of Indiana, it was
an improper use of judicial power to create an exception to the
Act.
Finally, the court's reliance on other jurisdictions is tenuous.
When it relied on other jurisdictions, the court failed to take into
account the important distinction between states that have codified
comparative fault statutes, and those that have not. Because
185 Webb, 575 N.E.2d at 992; see also supratext accompanying notes 77-80.

https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol11/iss2/5

30

Carroll: Analysis of Mark v. Moser: Determining Duty of Care Between Sport

2001]

DUTY OF CARE IN SPORTS

455

foreign jurisdictions are divided on the duty issue, had the court
taken this distinction into account it would have found persuasive
arguments for imposing a negligence duty.
Robert Carroll
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